Citizenship has become increasingly associated-both symbolically and programmatically-with a person's capacity to perform paid work. For feminists this raises a key question: can women's participation in paid work become the basis for their inclusion in welfare settlements? The question is examined here by exploring the extent to which women's absorption into export-oriented manufacturing industries has created the conditions for their social citizenship in three industrializing countries (South Korea, China, and Mexico). The social rights considered are limited to pensions and health care.
Introduction
If in an earlier era citizenship was bound up with the capacity to bear arms and defend the nation, in more modern times it has been associated-both symbolically and programmaticallywith a person's capacity to "labor," or perform paid work (Lister 1997) . 1 For feminists this raises a key question: can women's participation in paid work become the basis for their inclusion in welfare settlements? In the case of advanced industrialized countries, as Orloff (2002) has argued, historically men gained social rights (to pensions, unemployment insurance, and the like) on the basis of their paid work, while women's access to benefits was usually mediated by their relationships to men. She further suggests that this set of arrangements has been fundamentally challenged by the movement of women into the realm of paid work. Women have gained "symbolic and material resources for citizenship, as well as access to benefits initially created with male workers in mind. Their increasing presence in the workforce has also spurred the development of new forms of income security, such as parental leaves" (11).
Does the capacity to perform paid work facilitate women's access to social rights in the newly industrializing countries of Asia and Latin America, where social policies are less institutionalized? Is women's incorporation into paid work likely to lead to their emancipation, "the Engelsian myth" as Ruth Pearson (2004) calls it, "the view that women's empowerment, or emancipation as it used to be called, lies in their incorporation into the paid workforce" (117)?
We examine this question by exploring the extent to which women's absorption into export-oriented manufacturing industries has created the conditions for their social citizenship. The paper looks at evidence from three countries where such industries have had a significant presence and where women have constituted a significant share of the workforce: South Korea (Korea hereafter), China, and Mexico. Given the difficulties of accessing reliable data, the social rights considered are limited to pensions and health care rather than the broader range of social policies relevant to women as gendered workers, such as reproductive rights, childcare, and freedom from violence and harassment. The issue of care in particular, whether for young children, the elderly, or those with illnesses (in the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic), is critical for understanding women's engagement with paid work. Research on the institutions of care in the context of developing countries remains in its infancy, even though "time use surveys" are being increasingly conducted in these countries, providing much-needed empirical evidence on some dimensions of unpaid care.
Female Employment in a Globalized Context
The past two decades have seen a remarkable rise in women's economic activity rates in many parts of the world, especially in Latin America (see Figure 1) . 2 While some of this increase may be attributed to the greater attentiveness of labor force enumerators to the variety of work that women perform (seasonal, casual, subsistence, and so on), it is also suggestive of a number of real changes. More women must now work to ensure family survival, in the face of declining real wages and the increased monetary cost of subsistence resulting from the imposition of various fees and charges for health and education services and the general commoditization of different aspects of local economies (Pearson 2004) . Research from sub-Saharan Africa, for example, shows that in the context of economic crisis and reform, it is becoming increasingly necessary for all household members-whether female or male, young or old-to take on paid work (Bryceson 1999) . Even in middle-income countries such as Mexico, households have had to multiply the number of breadwinners in response to declining real wages and shrinking job opportunities, with women's labor force participation almost doubling over a twenty-year period (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira 2004) .
But the forces propelling women into the workforce are diverse: falling fertility rates, rising levels of education, and changes in lifestyles and women's own aspirations also account for some of the surge, especially among the more educated urban households. A further impetus, stronger in some contexts than others, has come from the increased demand for women workers in some sectors of the economy, particularly export sectors that have experienced considerable growth in recent years. Much of this has been in lowskilled manufacturing, notably in garments, footwear, and electronic products. 3 This increase in demand for women's labor has been extensively analyzed in terms of the comparative advantage of women's "nimble fingers," the docility and productivity of women's work, and the resulting lower unit costs attainable with the employment of "cheap" female labor (Elson and Pearson 1981) . But has women's growing presence in the realm of paid work, and particularly in high profile factory work, facilitated their access to social rights, along the lines suggested by Orloff (2002) for the advanced industrialized countries?
There has been a curious absence of systematic analysis of social policies in the extensive literature exploring different facets of women's employment in export-oriented industries (Razavi 1999) . Economists-whether neoclassical, heterodox, or feminist-have tended to focus on wages and gender-based wage gaps in the context of export-orientation (Seguino 1997; Tzannatos 1995) . Other strands in the literature, more sociological or anthropological in approach, explore the processes of gender subordination and women's agency in households, communities, and factories where women workers live and work (Hsiung 1996; Kabeer 2000; Lee 1995) . The literature by trade unions and women's organizations is more concerned with working conditions in the so-called global factories (Heyzer and Kean 1988) . This third cluster comes closest to asking questions that relate to social policy in the narrow sense of concern for the rights and security of the workforce, highlighting the absence of health and safety provisions, and the ban on workers' rights to organize. But little attempt has been made to link these findings to broader social policy trajectories and their gendered nature. 4 It seems surprising that there has not been any serious attempt to examine the possible connections (or lack thereof) between female employment in the highly feminized export-oriented industrial processes and broader social policy arrangements. The implicit assumption seems to be that women's work in export-oriented industries is taking place in a social policy vacuum. Such an assumption may, in turn, be premised on a number of arguments. First, that employment in globally competitive low-wage export-oriented industries cannot generate anything but a very low wage. Second, that coinciding with the neoliberal turn in state policies and the constraints imposed by "globalization," women's emergence as paid workers has taken place alongside labor market informalization, welfare retrenchment, and the roll-back of the regulatory state. And finally, that "footloose" foreign capital, considered to be the main employer in these export-oriented industries, enjoys special privileges in developing countries, which effectively absolve it of all responsibility for workers' welfare.
At first glance, these factors seem to offer plausible explanations as to why women's overwhelming numerical presence in exportoriented industries in the South cannot facilitate their access to social rights. But on closer scrutiny, they are far from convincing. For a start, there is no known theoretically derived a priori argument to suggest that employment in export-oriented industries in open economies must be devoid of all social rights. Nor does the historical evidence point to such an inevitable outcome; precisely the opposite argument was made by political economists to explain how small European open economies had responded to external vulnerability (Katzenstein 1985) . 5 The vulnerabilities that more open economies were exposed to, these analysts argued, required greater social protection, social cohesion, and solidarity, and the welfare state was seen as a response to the challenges of economic integration (Gough 2000) .
In developing countries, export-oriented industries have taken root in national contexts marked by different political economies and industrial strategies-from the more interventionist or activist Northeast Asian states that gave temporary protection to infant industries conditional upon export promotion, to the "enclave type" export-processing zones (Jomo 2003) . Foreign direct investment (FDI) was not always the prime mover; in many countries it was national capital that nurtured export-oriented production processes (Jomo 2003) .
Nor was the growth of female employment always taking place in a social policy vacuum. Some of the most celebrated cases, like the maquiladoras 6 in Mexico, took hold in the context of development strategies that had built nascent welfare states since the early 1920s (which may or may not have been inclusive of women). Much the same could be said of the East Asian late industrializers. These states may not have nurtured European style welfare states, but they underwrote the low money wages paid to industrial workers with a range of implicit or "surrogate" social policies (Chang 2004) . As Chang has convincingly argued, there were a lot more social policies in East Asia than is typically believed, if social policy is understood more broadly than "welfare-state" type of policies. Yet the mainstream debate has not shown any interest in the gender implications of these surrogate social policies, even though women have been key players in the region's industrialization strategies.
Globalization and Social Policy
There are significant differences among industrializing countries that have nurtured export-oriented industries, both in terms of their economic/industrial policy traditions as well as their social policy arrangements, however embryonic these may be. It therefore seems important to highlight these policy differences in order to show that there is more than one way of nurturing employment in exportoriented industries, and with potentially different implications for women workers. These diversities are useful in contesting the economically determinist and politically defeatist view that participation in the global economy must always deny nation states, and women workers in particular, "the possibility of locally negotiated settlements about social protection, workplace norms and nonwage benefits" (Pearson 2004, 118) .
Despite initial fears that "globalization" would lead to institutional and policy convergence marked by state retrenchment in both the economic and social policy realm, by the late 1990s radical versions of the globalization thesis were beginning to give way to analyses that saw globalization as an "unfinished and contradictory set of processes that are uneven in scope, depth, intensity and impact" (Yeats 2005, 4) . While some governments follow "neoliberal" prescriptions of fiscal austerity, privatization, and openness with regard to trade, investment, and finance, not all governments have followed this route. Moreover, as Linda Weiss has argued, there is more to governing the economy than macroeconomic policy (Weiss 1997, 18) , with industrial policies continuing to play a large role (in Asia for example), and social policies also finding favor with a variety of governments in both Asia and Latin America (Sheahan 2002) . The larger point here is that because state capacities differ and because "common external pressures are always filtered through domestic institutions and power distributions" (Huber 2002 , 2), they are likely to evoke different responses and outcomes. Hence, "the ability to exploit the opportunities of international economic change-rather than simply succumb to its pressures-will be much more marked in some countries than others" (Weiss 1997, 26) .
In the area of social policy in particular, analysts point to the continued dominance of national institutional traditions of interest representation and political consensus-building as important parameters shaping growth, employment, and welfare objectives in the advanced industrialized countries (Esping-Andersen 1996; Pierson 1998) . While there has been significant retrenchment in welfare states in recent years, the retrenchment was generally moderate and driven by domestic forces (such as budgetary pressures due to the rise in unemployment as well as demographic factors such as population aging) rather than external ones (Huber and Stephens forthcoming) . Hence the gloomy prognoses of the lack of viability of European welfare states in a globalized world does not seem to hold up to scrutiny.
Has economic liberalization led to state retrenchment in the social policy realm in other regions? The region that seems to counter the radical globalization thesis most clearly is East Asia, where globalization (or economic liberalization), far from marking the demise of social policy, has in fact given a new lease of life to policy interest in this area (Kwon 2005) . The 1997-98 crisis may have marked the end of an era in the region, forcing widespread structural revamping in the conduct of politics and management of the economy along more "liberal" lines, but it has also prompted a keen domestic debate on the welfare state, as well as significant shifts towards more inclusive forms of social welfare (Kwon 2005) . In Latin America, there have been a variety of social policy reforms and responses to the exclusionary effects of economic policies in the 1990s, turning the region into "a veritable laboratory for experimenting with strategies previously unknown anywhere else in the world" (Filgueira and Filgueira 2002, 127) . But how far these initiatives can tackle the traditional problems of social exclusion in the design of social policiesmore acute in some countries than others-remains to be seen (Filgueira and Filgueira 2002, 127) .
The "re-discovery of the social": Global Debates, Divides, and Silences
If interest in social policies is alive and well at the national level, then the epithet "re-discovery of the social" (Mkandawire 2001 ) provides a better depiction of the rehabilitation of social policies at the global level. This came in the wake of more than a decade of orthodox approaches that aimed to "get the economy right" independently of the social realm. In the 1990s, in response to the failures of orthodox approaches to generate growth and address widespread poverty, social policy became prominent on the agendas of a wide range of development agencies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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The apparent consensus on the importance of social policy, however, masks diverse, and often conflicting, conceptions of what social policy is, of the goals and values that underpin it, and of the nature and extent of state responsibility for social provision and delivery.
Since the late 1980s, the World Bank has recognized the need for some forms of compensatory programs so as to reverse the worse excesses of economic policies. A concern for "the social" initially took the form of targeted "safety nets" and "emergency funds" designed to capture those who fall through the cracks in the process of economic reform, as well as "expenditure shifting" (e.g., from secondary to primary education) to correct the tendency for betteroff groups to capture the bulk of social expenditure. These measures were to be grafted on to an unchanged policy agenda centered on economic liberalization and fiscal restraint. Later, in the World Development Report 2000/2001 Attacking Poverty, the "social risk management" framework was identified as the most sustainable basis for poverty reduction (World Bank 2000) . In this framework, the state was only expected to provide "social safety nets for risk coping" where or when the private sector fails, displaying continuities with the earlier generation of residual safety nets.
There have been different kinds of responses to the residualism promulgated by the World Bank. Some analysts argue that the dismal social and economic record of the past two decades underscores the unsustainability of the neoliberal project on its own terms. These critics suggest that an alternative approach to considering social policies as an afterthought to macroeconomic policies would start with the idea of "mainstreaming" social issues into macroeconomic policy by means of a "rethinking of macroeconomics and of the organization of macroeconomic policy processes" (Elson 2004: 64, Elson and Cagatay 2000) .
Two important implications follow from this perspective. First, it highlights the ambiguity of the distinction between "economic" and "social"-a position that has long been maintained by those who see "the economy" and its institutions, especially markets, as socially and politically embedded (Polanyi 1957) . Second, it underlines the fact that all policies (including macroeconomic policies) have a social content and/or social effect, and are thus social policies in the broad sense of the term. Deflationary policies, which have been in vogue over the past two decades, prioritize low rates of inflation, but are accompanied by stagnant employment opportunities. This stands in contrast to Keynesian economic thinking, which underpinned policy thinking for much of the post-World War II period: social development-expressed in terms of full employment-was embedded within Keynesian macroeconomic policy.
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A different, though overlapping response to the Bank's residualism has been to shift the global discourse on social policy away from targeting and to reassert the politics of social solidarity and universalism.
10 Drawing on the historical experiences of Nordic developmental states, the argument is made that social policy is not only an end in itself but also a means of enhancing economic dynamism, development, and growth-in short, that social policy is developmental (Mkandawire 2001) .
A gender perspective on welfare policies in the South, as in the North until quite recently, has remained on the margins of this debate. Yet both the process of social policy reform and its outcomes are inescapably gendered. Social policies are always filtered through social institutions that are gendered-families, households, and communities; labor markets and markets for the provision of social services and income transfers; care arrangements; health and education systems; states and public sectors. Mainstream debates on social policy, however, have failed to engage with these concerns; gender has indeed been the "silent term" (Mackintosh and Tibandebage 2006) . The Health Sector Reform model promulgated by the World Bank in many African countries, for example, has been devastating for low-income households, and for low-income women in particular; yet the proposed reforms (user fees, insurance, market liberalization) do not refer to "gender differences in need or ability to pay" (p. 238).
The same "silence" marks the policy debates on pension provision. This has been an important area of policy reform in many middle-income countries in the 1980s and 1990s, especially in Latin America. The privatization model has been promulgated on the basis of its presumably superior financial viability and efficiency and its positive impact on the development of capital markets. While most of these claims are not substantiated, 11 a fully privatized scheme has the added disadvantage of reducing the scope for pooling and cross-subsidization, while the linking of pension benefits to overall contributions penalizes those with breaks in their employment record and long life expectancy (Huber and Stephens 2000a) . This has adverse implications for gender equality and women's prospects of economic security in old age.
Do gender concerns receive a greater hearing amongst those who want to see social concerns reinscribed into macroeconomic thinking? Peter Townsend (2004) for example underlines how social concerns were inscribed at the heart of the Keynesian development vision, legitimizing the pursuit of the twin goals of full employment and universal social welfare (through social security, universal child allowances, and public social services). His discussion, however, implicitly assumes that full employment will be inclusive of all social groups, including all adult women. While the need for universal child allowances is discussed at some length, there is no mention that some adult women may not be able to conform to the ideal of life-long, full-time employment, and that this is likely to prejudice their access to social security benefits.
Some feminists, such as Diane Elson, contend that economic policy approaches that rely solely or principally on full employment to achieve socially desirable outcomes are likely to remain severely limited, given the ways in which labor markets are themselves gendered and their failure to recognize the relationship between paid and unpaid forms of work that is just as much at the heart of provisioning of needs as paid forms of labor. "In order to be gender equitable, full-employment policies must be complemented by entitlements for those in informal or part-time paid work and entitlements for the providers of unpaid caring labour as citizens in their own right" (Elson 2004, 70) .
Developmentalist Social Policies and Gender in East Asia
The policies underpinning East Asian industrialization have been keenly debated in recent years (Amsden 1989; Wade 1990; Jomo 2003; World Bank 1993) . Gender issues have been largely absent from these highly charged policy debates, even though there have been a number of noteworthy studies by feminist economists and anthropologists showing the ways in which gender inequalities were implicated in the industrialization strategies pursued by East Asian governments (see Seguino 1997 and Hsiung 1996 on South Korea and Taiwan, respectively).
The two East Asian countries discussed here-Korea and Chinashare a number of historical and institutional characteristics. Emerging from decades of colonialism, war, conflict, and insecurity, both countries built strong state structures in order to survive their tumultuous geopolitical predicaments, to develop, and to "catch up" (Woo-Cumings 1999) . In this process of compressed development, markets were strongly "governed" (in the case of Korea) and suppressed (in prereform China) and the direction and pace of development was strongly guided by the state. Despite their divergent political ideologies, both countries implemented radical land redistribution programs that left behind an egalitarian legacy (between social classes).
However, less widely appreciated in the mainstream literature is the fact that these relatively egalitarian (until recently) societies also harbor some of the most rigid gender hierarchies in the world, reflected in their highly masculine sex ratios. In the case of China, the one-child policy has combined with strong social norms around son preference to produce highly adverse conditions for women's life chances, killing millions of females through sex-selective abortions and postbirth neglect (Klasen and Wink 2003) .
Are gender hierarchies and biases also embedded within labor markets and in social arrangements and institutions for welfare provisioning? Korea's notoriously wide gender gaps in wages have often been taken to suggest that this is indeed the case, whereas the verdict on prereform China has been less conclusive, given the ways in which women's labor force participation was supported by state policies. However, as Peng (2006) argues, feminist positions on countries like Korea are sharply divided, with some arguing that a good deal of progress is being made, which is not being sufficiently reflected in economic and social indicators given the time lags between policies and outcomes. Some of these policy changes are addressed here.
Korean Developmentalism
Korea's early developmentalist era of compressed capitalist industrialization was followed from the late 1980s by a gradual shift toward a less interventionist approach-a trend that was reinforced by further liberalization and deregulation under the aegis of the IMF to deal with the severe economic and financial crisis of 1997-98. Government intervention forced the pace of industrialization through its close association with big business (the chaebols) on the one hand, and the banking sector on the other-the very structural ties that came in for sharp criticism by the Bretton Woods institutions after the crisis (Hyoung et al. 2004 ). The aim of industrial policy until the mid-1970s was to promote light industry, the output of which was increasingly destined for export markets. Thereafter and until the late 1980s, for strategic reasons, the focus turned to promoting more capital-and technology-intensive "heavy" industries and petrochemicals (Seguino 1997) . These policies by all accounts helped produce the highly successful economic transformation.
From the early 1960s and until the 1997 crisis, Korea maintained a spectacular annual rate of growth of real GDP of about 8 percent that generated what was tantamount to full employment for men, increasing levels of employment for women, and overall growth in real wages averaging about 7 percent a year (Hyoung et al. 2004 ). However, the extent to which industrialization, structural transformation, and rapid economic growth reduced gender hierarchies in the labor force and gender gaps in wages was limited.
First, while from 1970 to 1997, the numbers of women in paid employment rose by almost two and a half times, with manufacturing and services absorbing the greatest numbers from the growing female labor force, after 1990 (i.e., even prior to the crisis), both the absolute numbers of women workers in manufacturing and the share of women in total manufacturing employment declined (Hyoung et al. 2004 ). This points to the "de-feminization" of manufacturing employment, which has been observed in a number of other export-oriented economies as well (Ghosh 1999; UNDESA 1999) . In the case of Korea, despite the changing industrial structure resulting from the government's promotion of heavy industry and petrochemicals, women were mainly employed in light industries (which were experiencing relative decline) while the new capital-and technology-intensive industries principally employed men. In other words, the shift from the so-called "low road" to "high road" industrialization was marked by the gradual displacement of women workers.
Second, after several decades of industrial development and high growth, about 40 percent of female workers had regular full-time jobs, while more than 60 percent were hired on temporary or daily contracts (Hyoung et al. 2004 ). The bulk of employed women therefore faced considerable insecurity and instability regarding their employment and income (with implications for their access to welfare, as we will see later). However, contrary to the myth that all Korean males had "life-long employment," Hyoung et al. (2004) show that only about two-thirds of male workers had regular contracts (see Table 1 ). Nevertheless, the relative share of men and women within each category of employment displays the familiar pattern whereby men take the lion's share of regular jobs, whereas women constitute a higher proportion of employees on temporary and daily contracts.
Third, despite gradual improvements in women's wages, gender wage inequality in Korea remained one of the largest among the OECD countries for which data are available, with the average all industry ratio of women's to men's wages standing at 61 percent in 1997 (OECD 2000 cited in Hyoung et al. 2004) . Moreover, the 1997-98 crisis had disastrous consequences for gender equality. The introduction of labor market flexibility allowed enterprises to rid themselves of regular workers during the crisis, hitting women especially hard (Lee and Rhee 1999) . This interrupted the slow progress that women in particular had made in accessing the more secure jobs, so that by the end of 1999 women had a lower share of such jobs than in 1990 (see Table 2 ).
Work and Welfare in Korea
The Korean welfare regime, described as "productavist welfare capitalism," placed heavy emphasis on social policies that bolstered the regime's industrialization effort, with considerable investment going into education, health, and housing (Holliday 2000) . The preoccupation with economic development favored welfare policies dominated by contribution-based social insurance programs geared toward core industrial workers (Kwon 2005) . Social welfare provision included four social insurance schemes (Industrial Accident, Pensions, Employment Insurance, and Health Insurance), together with a minimal public safety net. Employment policies until the 1980s provided "life time" job security, and thus a certain protection for a stratum of male workers and their families. Corporate welfare also played an important role throughout the period, especially for regular workers in the chaebols. The pressures for corporate restructuring after 1997-98 seem to have posed a challenge to this particular style of welfarism, while at the same time catalyzing the gradual extension of the social insurance programs.
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Has Korean welfarism been inclusive of women? The selective nature of social welfare provisioning prior to the reforms of the 1990s tended to reinforce socioeconomic inequalities and did not deliver equitable access to women. The lion's share of redistribution through social policies went to the more privileged and high-income wage earners in large-scale businesses and in the state sector (Kwon 2005) . More specifically on gender inequalities, the sectoral distribution of women's employment, the size of the firms in which they were employed, the occupations in which they were clustered, and the nature of their contracts all combined to ensure that both the direct benefits of employment (remuneration, stability of employment, career enhancement, accumulation of savings) and indirect outcomes (access to social welfare, insurance, and security in old age) were generally less advantageous for women workers than they were for male workers (Hyoung et al. 2004) .
For example, more generous corporate nonwage benefits were provided by large firms, whereas the bulk of women workers were concentrated in the small-and medium-sized firms, which could ill-afford the same level of benefits. Moreover, even the key employment-related social insurance schemes were only extended to small-and medium-sized firms after considerable delay and, in any case, could only benefit a small number of working women due to the high proportion on temporary and daily contracts. Even though small firms (of under five employees) where women were concentrated were legally able to subscribe to social insurance schemes, implementation of this law was slow.
The gap in welfare between large, medium, and small firms may have narrowed in recent years as a result of two parallel developments: first, the corporate governance reforms causing large firms to scale back fringe benefits, and second, the fact that large numbers of workers on a variety of contracts (including temporary and daily) in small-and medium-sized firms have become eligible for membership in the social insurance schemes. Whether this will indeed have an equalizing effect on gender disparities in access to welfare entitlements is an open question. Much depends on how thoroughly the extension of the social insurance schemes to employees in the smalland medium-sized firms is implemented, and whether the government is willing to step in with financial subsidies.
In the case of pension provision, the national pension insurance scheme (National Pension Plan or NPP) has been gradually extended to all workers, including daily, temporary, self-employed, and family workers (Peng 2006) . Although the number of people covered by the NPP has more than doubled between 1990 (4,651,678) and 2002 (12,248,483) , it is estimated that women make up less than a third of the total (29.5 percent in 1990 and 30.1 percent in 2001). The proportion of women covered by NPP increased from 6.4 percent of the total population in 1990 to 15.6 percent in 2002, which is still below the male rates of 15.2 percent and 36.7 percent, respectively (Peng 2006) .
If benefits are strictly determined on the basis of employment-based contributions, then the implicit bias against women workers is likely to remain, given the patterns of female employment. If, on the other hand, the government steps in with financial subsidies to compensate those with lower contributions, then the potential for a more egalitarian welfare system will be enhanced. This is the path taken by the National Health Insurance (NHI), which has expanded its coverage since the late 1970s, and which can claim to be universalistic since the latest wave of reforms undertaken in 2000 (Kwon and Tchoe 2005) .
Universalization has been achieved by creating two separate health insurance funds (or risk pooling groups) that are managed by the NHI Corporation: one fund is for wage and salary earners who pay contributions on their taxable incomes, and the other is for "residencebased" members (the self-employed, farmers, and temporary workers, who are not classified as wage and salary earners) whose contributions are calculated on the basis of different criteria such as the assets they own, sex, age, and number of family members;
13 the third source of funding comes from government subsidies. Kwon and Tchoe's (2005) assessment of the redistributive impact of NHI integration (across different income groups) shows that among the first group (wage and salary earners) integration has had a positive impact on redistribution, with the lower income groups paying much less than before, while the highest income groups are now paying more. Their data is not disaggregated by gender. However, if we assume that women workers and salary earners cluster among the lower income categories (not an unrealistic assumption), then the impact of integration can be judged positively from a gender perspective. Yet the evidence from household expenditure surveys reviewed by the authors also shows that out-of-pocket payment for health has in fact increased relative to income for the lowest income groups in 2000 compared to 1996, which dampens the overall redistributive impact. The assessment also found positive evidence of redistribution among the residence-based members' group, where women in precarious work conditions are likely to be found. Kwon and Tchoes' overall assessment is that although integration has increased equitable burden sharing, it has not yet improved overall equity because NHI's share of total health expenditure is still close to 55 percent, while the rest is borne by households themselves.
In sum, there is little doubt that Korean women workers have been at a disadvantage in terms of welfare entitlements under both the developmentalist era and in the period of welfare expansion, largely due to the gendering of labor markets and the way in which welfare entitlements have been, and continue to be, linked to employment-based contributions. As Hyoung et al. (2004) conclude, "There is therefore a prima facie case for concluding that the choice of a welfare system rooted in work-related insurance (and corporate welfare benefits clearly tied to employment) in preference to a citizenship-based welfare system is likely to prejudice many if not most women, whether as paid workers or carers" (54). Yet the transformation of Korea's welfare state, most evident in the case of NHI, provides scope for women's inclusion in new welfare settlements, even though an assessment of gender-based redistributions requires detailed empirical evidence that is not yet available.
Greater job insecurity, cut-backs in corporate benefits, and the politicization of social welfare issues in a democratic context have provoked a keen debate in Korea on whether the country should proceed toward a full-fledged redistributive welfare state that embodies citizen rights financed by general taxation, or whether it should continue to rely on a system of social insurance. This context presents openings for women's advocacy groups to exert political pressure and turn women's interests in social policy into electoral issues for political parties to take up. The vibrancy of women's organizations and their advocacy of social policies suggest that this challenge is being taken up within civil society (Peng 2006) .
Gender Equality in China: Under State Socialism and Market Reform
Korean developmentalism was driven by strong nationalist sentiments. Feminists have often been critical of nationalism for the way it subordinates women's interests to the larger goals of national struggle and nation building. State socialism by contrast makes an ethical commitment to the "emancipation of women" based on their juridical equality with men, their entry into paid work, and access to social rights, even if the "real socialisms" of the twentieth century left behind a more varied and ambivalent record.
China is interesting because it illustrates both the considerable progress that working class women were able to make under state socialism in terms of wages, welfare, and employment security, as well as the stubborn persistence of gender hierarchies and biases that were difficult to dislodge. The Chinese style of economic and social restructuring-whatever its merits and divergences from the orthodox liberalization policies 14 -is, however, fast eroding some of the hard-won gains that an older generation of women workers made under socialism, even if one remains sanguine about the prospects that have opened up for a younger generation of largely rural migrant women in China's booming export factories (Lee 1995) .
In addition to major cleavages in welfare entitlements between rural and urban populations in prereform China, it is widely understood that in the absence of a market, significant disparities persisted among the urban population through "bureaucratic redistribution" of resources and welfare benefits (Lee 2005, 1) . In prereform China, social welfare was largely distributed through the enterprise: state employees in government offices and workers in state-owned enterprises (SOE) enjoyed the greatest job security and the most generous welfare benefits (health, pensions, education), while those who worked in enterprises operated by local governments and by collectives had far less generous entitlements. This stratification had a distinct gender subtext.
Men greatly outnumbered women in the formal state sector (only 32 percent of permanent state workers were female) and also predominated in senior grades, while collectives constituted a feminized sector where close to 57 percent of the workforce was female.
15 On the eve of the reform, women's average wage constituted nearly 83 percent of men's, and male-headed households were given priority in terms of welfare housing allocations (Logan et al. 1998 and Ping 1998 cited in Lee 2005) . Hence, despite state efforts to increase women's labor force participation and the apparent gender-neutrality of the welfare model, stratification of the labor force by gender was translated into stratified welfare entitlements for women and men.
In the context of economic reform, the private sector has proliferated while the state-owned enterprises have come under increasing pressure to become more competitive. The latter have laid-off workers in large numbers, job security for life has come under attack for making workers complacent, and enterprise-based responsibility for social welfare, health, and pensions in particular, has been trimmed (Davin 2004 ). Initially at least, a disproportionate number of workers who were laid-off from the SOEs were women (Lee 2005) . In 1993, the official union reported that even though women made up 37 percent of all state workers, they constituted 60 percent of those laid-off and unemployed; by 1999 the corresponding figure was 44.6 percent (Lee 2005) . It has also been suggested that a disproportionate share of those who remain among the longterm unemployed are women (Cook and Jolly 2000) . As Davin (2004) observes, for a generation that was brought up to believe that women should be in the labor force and to draw their self-esteem from the contribution their work made to their society (and families), the impact of economic reform has been hugely negative.
Work and Welfare in the Era of Market Reform
The rise of the private and foreign sector has led to a rapid growth of demand for women workers both in the export-oriented factories of the Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the coastal provinces of the Eastern seaboard, as well as in the town and village enterprises (TVEs), reflecting significant transformation in the structure of the labor market since China reoriented its economy to global markets and undertook extensive economic reforms in the 1980s. The proportion of gross industrial output from state-owned or state-controlled enterprises has declined from nearly 75 percent in 1981 to a low of 18 percent in 2001; over the same period, private, foreign-owned, and joint-venture firms have mushroomed (Lee 2005 , Table 1 ). While the latter have capitalized on the social investments made during the previous era (in terms of infrastructure and access to a healthy and educated workforce), domestic liberalization (of both land and welfare) is leading to increasing inequalities and the erosion of human capabilities (Croll 1999) .
In the SEZs, there is a multifaceted labor hierarchy: most technical and managerial posts are held by foreigners, though some Chinese middle class men also attain these positions, while the semiskilled workers are predominantly female. Most of the permanent workers are local inhabitants who have worked for some time in the new industries. But the majority of the work force is recruited from rural areas, many of them released from agriculture as a result of decollectivization in the late 1970s. It is difficult to provide a breakdown of the labor force in export processing by sex; however, estimates based on numerous surveys show female workforces of the order of 80 percent (Davin 2004) . They have temporary status in their place of work and no access to social protection mechanisms or welfare benefits. They return home periodically, during spells of unemployment, when sick, or to give birth. In the absence of formal social protection mechanisms, for these migrant workers, access to land in their home villages constitutes a form of social protection against the harsh vagaries of market forces (Lee 2005) .
These developments have posed serious questions about the future direction of social policy. The state has indicated an interest in developing a contribution-based social security system for all workers, regardless of the nature of their employment contract (migrant, temporary, permanent) and the ownership status of their enterprise (state, collective, private, joint venture). But it seems reluctant to take the fiscal burden of social provisioning upon itself. This has effectively shifted the burden of worker welfare away from the state and toward the employers and workers themselves (Lee 2005) . Hence, Chinese reformers, like their Korean counterparts, have shown a preference for contribution-based social insurance programs-an institutional arrangement that follows in the path of enterprise-based welfare system. In practice, these systems still cover only a limited number of employees, and enterprises, even newly established ones in the private sector, continue to play an important welfare function (Davin 2004 ).
In the case of pension reform, the law requires all enterprises to participate in the new contributory system with centralized management in the hands of the provincial governments, and with contributions from both employers and employees deposited in two kinds of accounts-a social pooling account and an individual account (Lee 2005) . The implementation of pension reform has met with serious problems. First, in terms of coverage, the collectives and all other nonstate enterprises have only managed to achieve 53 percent and 30 percent, respectively (Feng 2001 cited in Lee 2005 , while survey evidence from the province of Guangdong (China's export powerhouse and popular destination of migrant workers) found that close to 74 percent of migrants did not have any form of social security in 2001. The state-owned enterprises have been successful in expanding coverage of the pension scheme, reaching 96 percent in 1998. But the pressing problem in this case is the inability of many old state firms to pay their contributions. This has caused massive pension default and arrears which, in the late 1990s, led to large-scale petitions and protests (Lee 2005) .
A contributory health insurance scheme, based on contributions from both employers and employees and with both individual and social pooling accounts, was launched in 1998 following pilot schemes in several regions (Lee 2005; Wang 2006 ). Thus far, implementation of this new scheme has been uneven, both in terms of the coverage it has achieved as well as the beneficiaries' actual access to benefits. This is not surprising given the diversity in local economic conditions and local state capacities across China, with some local governments experiencing serious difficulties in enforcing the legal responsibility of employers to register their workers and to make regular contributions (Lee 2005) .
A recent analysis of the scheme's implementation in Shanghai (one of the cities where the largest coverage has been achieved 16 ), demonstrates how an apparently gender neutral policy, filtered through structural inequalities of gender-in terms of need and ability to "contribute"-is likely to produce unequal outcomes (Wang 2006) . The fact that coverage is limited to those with urban residence and registered employment effectively means that the unemployed, the informal workers, and the migrants are categorically excluded from this scheme. The fact that women earn lower wages than men, retire five years earlier, and have a longer life expectancy than men (a difference of four years) further militates against them in a system where individual contributions are closely tied to benefits.
In the context of decentralization, budgetary responsibilities for price subsidies, housing, urban infrastructure, and welfare have shifted to local governments. Given the country's uneven economic development, decentralization has led to uneven welfare provision. Pension arrears for example become an acute problem for firms in the old industrial "rustbelt" despite repeated central government demands that local governments guarantee payment to retirees and laid-off workers (Lee 2005) . This has in turn led to intensified forms of labor conflict and social protest, especially since the mid-1990s when the pace of privatization was intensified. The central government has tried to respond to such common grievances with "measured mixes of concessions and repression" (31). In the current political context, the prospects for a clear articulation of women's interests remain dim, not only by the absence of vibrant women's movements or civic platforms where such interests may be debated, but also by the fragmentation of working class women as a potential constituency.
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Labor Market Informalization and the Social State in Mexico
The fact that many East Asian countries experienced spectacular economic growth, especially from 1975 to 1995, at a time when Latin America was confronted with enormous economic problems, has led to fruitful comparative research on "different models of capitalism" (Huber 2002 ). This comparative work has exposed some of the weaknesses of Latin American models of economic intervention as well as the shortcomings of social policies financed through "high deficit spending and excessive monetary expansion" (Huber 2002, 7) . Filgueira and Filgueira (2002) further highlight a fundamental problem in the design of social policies, namely their strong orientation toward the urban sectors, and exclusive coverage for those sectors that were integrated into the formal labor market. Vast sections of the population-rural workers, domestic workers, and those in the informal economy-were thus excluded in many countries. These structural biases were also gender-coded, with significant numbers of women being denied welfare entitlements in their own right. Where women's needs were acknowledged, entitlements were gained principally on the basis of their place within the family, as wives and mothers providing unpaid care (Molyneux 2006) .
In the typology of welfare states that Filgueira and Filgueira (2002) propose, Mexico (along with Brazil) falls under the category of "dual regimes," characterized by near-universal primary education, significant (though stratified) health coverage, but a much less developed, less inclusive, and highly stratified social security system. Dual regimes are also marked by significant regional diversities.
The history of social legislation in Mexico must be traced to the Mexican Revolution and the subsequent corporatist arrangement that was forged between the authoritarian State and its key social constituencies of peasants and workers (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira 2004). The basic conditions for industrial employment were legislated in 1932 (guaranteeing a minimum wage, paid vacations, paid maternity allowance, and so on). The most important development in the 1940s was the creation of social insurance, which progressively expanded its coverage from the 1960s through to 1980s (Laurell 2003) . The problem, however, has been the limited reach of a social insurance model that is tied to formal employment in a country where close to 40 percent of nonagricultural work force is informally employed (Alarcon and Zepeda 2004) . 18 Mexican social insurance programs-composed of the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) for private-sector workers, and the Social Security Institute for State Workers (ISSSTE) for public employees-cover no more than 55 percent of the population, even though 70 percent of those covered only earn three times the minimum wage and are technically speaking below the poverty line (Laurell 2003 ).
Women's ability to access social insurance benefits linked to employment prior to the 1980s was hampered by their relatively low rates of labor force participation (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira 2004). Women's presence in the industrial labor force remained below 5 percent for much of the 1930s and 1940s, and went up only slowly during the period of import substitution industrialization, from around 13 percent in 1950 to 16 percent in 1970. Moreover, women industrial workers remained concentrated in labor-intensive industries where they received low wages and were even used as home workers with no rights to social benefits.
Social legislation for those outside the formal labor force (i.e., the rural population and the urban poor) was slow to emerge and meagre in benefits. Nevertheless, from the early 1970s, serious efforts were made to sustain standards of living in the face of growing inflation by controlling the prices of basic items of consumption and exempting them from value-added taxation (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira 2004), and through the provision of a rural health care system for the uninsured poor through the IMSS (IMSS-Solidaridad), which was more comprehensive than services operated through the Ministry of Health (Laurell 2003) . As a result of these measures, the incidence of poverty diminished steadily in the 1970s but increased sharply in the 1980s, reaching a high point of 41.3 percent of the population in 1989 (Alarcon and Zepeda 2004) .
Despite women's low rates of participation in social insurance programs, their needs were nevertheless acknowledged as wives, mothers, and carers through what may be called a "maternalist" strand in Mexican social policy, which concerned itself with maternal health and child welfare (Molyneux 2006 ).
Feminization of Labor
The financial debacle in 1982 precipitated a serious decline in wages and a steep rise in women's labor force participation, from 21 percent in 1979 to nearly 36 percent in 1999 (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira 2004). Whereas prior to 1982, the state's probusiness industrial policies (low wages, high tariffs) were somewhat tempered by measures aimed at maintaining minimum living standards, in the subsequent period these implicit subsidies were increasingly eroded and/or targeted to a dwindling proportion of the "deserving" poor. Thus with extensive income contraction, declining real wages, and the rising monetary cost of subsistence, family survival has increasingly come to rely on the intensification of women's paid work, as well as of their unpaid care work in both individualized and collective forms (Gonzalez de la Rocha 1994).
Serious concerns have been expressed about the poor employment record of Mexico's manufacturing sector in the 1980s and 1990s when as high as 46 percent of the new jobs created were in largely informal micro firms (Alarcon and Zepeda 2004) . By the year 2000, according to ILO sources, 41.4 percent of urban employment in Mexico was in precarious occupations, 19 and the slight improvement that was seen during the years of fast growth (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) did not prove to be sustainable (Alarcon and Zepeda 2004) . Most employment creation within manufacturing over the past 10-15 years has been concentrated in the maquiladora sector, a large part of it located in the Northern States near the Mexican-US border. 20 Alarcon and Zepada (2004) estimate that close to 85 percent of new jobs created in manufacturing fixed units (i.e., excluding micro enterprises) between 1993 and 1998 was in the maquiladoras. The fact that women make up about half of this workforce would seem to suggest that they are in a position to reap benefits from their position as contributors to the principal engine of national economic growth. Has this been the case?
The contribution of export-oriented manufacturing to employment, and to industrialization and development more broadly, has been fiercely debated by Mexican scholars (see Alarcon and Zepeda 2004 for different positions) . Critics have pointed to the "enclave" nature of these firms, their reliance on imported inputs, and the "sweatshop"-like conditions they provide for workers. While some of these criticisms still hold (e.g. reliance on imported inputs, weak links with other parts of the economy), others claim that maquiladoras have undergone a real transformation away from the typical sweatshop-like conditions found earlier, as a result of industrial upgrading in the 1980s and 1990s (Gereffi 2003) .
Women constitute a significant, though declining, share of this workforce (Table 3) , their share of blue-collar workers having gone down from 67.3 to 45 percent between 1975 and 1999. It is widely believed that part of the reason for the declining share of women in the industrial labor force, and particularly in the maquiladoras, has been the substitution of men for women in more technologically advanced industries and occupations (the phenomenon of defeminization referred to earlier). On the more positive side, there is some evidence to suggest that women workers in maquiladora cities, particularly in the north, are better protected and have greater employment stability than those in non-maquiladora cities in the interior (Table 4) . Female maquiladora workers, for example, have access to basic legally mandatory benefits such as social security and paid vacations. Yet it is also true that women employees in the maquiladora sectors (now not jut confined to the northern border states) only have entitlements to a limited range of nonwage benefits and have little or no access to gender-specific support such as childcare provision or maternity leave, "both major necessities for women workers, and de jure mandatory entitlements for all women employed in the formal sector" (Brachet-Marquez and de Oliveira, 2004, 150) .
However, women's relative advantages are more than offset by the deconcentration of low technology and low pay assembly plants to the interior provinces within which women outnumber men. In other words, the demand for women's labor appears to now be shifting from the higher-paying, better-protected factories on the northern border to a range of small establishments in the interior provinces which provide work that is lower paid, less visible, and has poorer access to protection and regulation. What is even more problematic is the steady decline in the mandatory protection of formal sector workers in Mexico as state enterprises were privatized, large scale retrenchments were implemented, and domestic enterprises were squeezed by trade liberalization, which exposed them to competition from cheaper imports. While men have been driven out of wage employment and into insecure forms of work, the available evidence points to relatively greater losses of income for women in formal labor markets: the average wages of females has deteriorated since 1984, and although there was some recovery by 1992, female wages were still only about 75 percent of men's, which was lower than the 1984 figure (Alarcon-Gonzalez and McKinley 1999) .
As Sheahan (2002) points out, "success on the external side is necessary but not sufficient" (47) for promoting rapid growth of employment combined with rising real wages and meaningful access to social welfare. There is some consensus among Mexican scholars that one of the most disappointing aspects of development experience in the 1980s and 1990s was the failure of economic reform to improve the living standards of large portions of the population and that "the central characteristics of Mexico's new economic modelespecially macroeconomic policies that depressed real wages and aggregate demand in order to control inflation, relatively modest employment creation in export-oriented sectors of the economy, and changes in government social welfare policies that reduced publicsector health care and social security-seriously aggravated these problems" (Middlebrook and Zepeda 2003, 34) .
The welfare reforms of the 1990s seem to have done very little to address the old inequalities in Mexico's social insurance program, while introducing further exclusions. One of the most adverse developments as far as women are concerned has been the reform of the public pension program, which eliminated the pay-as-you-go scheme based on publicly administered common funds with guaranteed annuities and replaced it with a mandatory program of individual retirement accounts managed by private financial intermediaries (Laurell 2003; Brachet-Marquez 2006) . In the process, work contribution requirements went up from 500 to 1,250 weeks to qualify for a pension (and 750 weekly contributions to qualify for medical care after retirement) (Laurell 2003) . In the context of labor market instability, this is likely to restrict the number of workers eligible to participate in the new pension program, with particularly adverse implications for women who are likely to experience more frequent breaks in their employment record. Parallel reforms are being carried out in health services which, in a nutshell, seek to establish "on the one hand, a market-driven system for those who can afford to pay for their own health care or have access to health insurance through mandatory social security and, on the other, a decentralized system of publicly provided basic services for the 'uninsurable'-that is, the poor" (Laurell 2003, 333) . The proposed reforms have not yet been fully implemented, and we do not know of any detailed gender analyses of their possible outcomes. But the new financing logic of "equal pay for equal services" (i.e., all insured paying the same premiums), which reform advocates view as a "necessary step toward introducing a market logic into health care provision" (p. 334), does not bode well for those with a weaker capacity to pay, which is likely to include a significant proportion of insured women. In fact, the new logic goes against the core principles underpinning solidarity and redistribution, namely "contribution in relation to income and benefit in relation to need."
What has become an important feature of the Mexican social welfare landscape is the design of anti-poverty programs targeted to the poor and the "marginalized." Women are explicitly targeted by some of these programs, the most extensive, and by some accounts successful, of these being Oportunidades, which seeks to break the cycle of poverty by enhancing the "human capital development" of children (i.e., their health, education, and nutrition). Mothers are targeted as recipients of stipends on behalf of their children and in return for the performance of certain maternal duties. For all that Oportunidades has achieved by way of improvement in child nutrition and primary school attendance, as far as women themselves are concerned, the outcomes have been at best limited and ambiguous (Molyneux 2006) .
Conclusions
The evidence in this paper gives no comfort to the strand of thinking that Ruth Pearson (2004) has termed "The Engelsian myth"-"the view that women's empowerment, or emancipation as it used to be called, lies in their incorporation into the paid workforce" (117).
The surge of China as the workshop of the world-with record growth rates, unprecedented FDI flows, and booming export-oriented manufacturing industries-has brought forth a fundamental restructuring of the labor force, marked by massive unemployment and welfare retrenchment for an older generation of women and men industrial workers and the en masse migration of a younger generation to global factories where the effects of "diabolical exploitation" (Lee 2005, iii) can only be soothed by fall-back on familial and kinship networks and village-based land rights. Authoritarianism and the absence of an autonomous labor movement notwithstanding, workers are politically restive, and the state responds to their grievances in a variety of ways. Earmarked funds are funnelled from Beijing to provincial coffers to deal with socially disruptive situations but, most importantly, the government is ardently pressing ahead with social security reform, targeting problem areas such as pension arrears, unpaid wages, unemployment benefits, and medical insurance. But the transition of welfare from an enterprise-based entitlement model to a social insurancebased one has meant general deterioration of worker livelihoods, uneven coverage, and rising uncertainty. Women-both the unemployed and the migrant workforce-confront gender-specific grievances, having been the first to be let go of when state enterprises were restructured, having to take on the extra burden of care when formal provision remains out of reach, and lacking formal social protection (for child birth, for example) in their place of work. Social security reform along the lines of a social insurance model is likely to leave out a significant part of the workforce (the migrants, the unemployed, and those in informal work situations) and penalize those who make lower labor market contributions.
Mexico's "engine of growth," the maquiladoras, may have been successful in generating a rising share of the country's foreign exchange earnings, diversifying its industrial base, climbing up the technology ladder, and even improving the terms and conditions on which some sections of their workforces are hired, but such success is overshadowed by the failure of the new economic model to sustain growth, generate employment, and resolve the crippling fiscal burden of the social welfare system (without having to go down the risky path of neoliberal welfare restructuring). Women workers may not have been part of the formal labor force with social rights under the old model of import substitution industrialization, and some of those engaged in the export-oriented manufacturing sector may have attained some forms of security through their employment, but in an economy where eight out of every ten new jobs created are in the informal economy (some of it catering to global markets via subcontracting arrangements), it is the absence of social rights for the majority of the female workforce that is a key, if not the key, policy concern. Do these workers have access to decent public welfare services and income security for contingencies?
When we pose the question in this way, the transformation of the welfare state in Korea, though hardly a feminist dream, begins to look promising. Korea has been the archetypical patriarchal developmental state, with a highly segmented workforce, wide gender-based wage gaps, and a highly selective welfare set-up. Recent policy efforts to universalize pension and health insurance, which happened admittedly under exceptional political circumstances (Kwon and Tchoe 2005) , suggest that there is considerable malleability within a contribution-based social insurance model, provided that the state is made to step in with financial subsidies and to facilitate cross-subsidies and redistribution. The gendered nature of both labor markets and the architecture of social policies need considerable policy and public attention before universal coverage can become a reality. The self-employed and those in irregular employment, among whom a disproportionate number are likely to be women, for example, have not registered under the Korean pension program as swiftly as it was expected. And even when universal coverage is achieved, as in the case of the health insurance program, copayments mean that overall equity is not yet within reach. We know from welfare state research in developed countries that accessible, citizenship-or residence-based public services (health, education, childcare) and noncontributory pensions and child allowances tend to be more progressive in their distributional outcomes as well as being more woman-friendly (and possibly more efficient as well) (Huber and Stephens 2000b) . But given the preferences that many governments are showing for contributionbased social insurance programs, ways must be found of capitalizing on the growing participation of women in different forms of paid work to facilitate their access to such programs. In theory it is possible to extend the coverage of social insurance programs to include informal and casual workers-and, as the case of Korea illustrates, this can be realized if their contributions are subsidized by the state.
of Development and Change) Blackwell 1999.
She can be contacted at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. Tel.: þ 41 22 9172885, fax: þ 41 22 9170650. E-mail: razavi@unrisd.org. This paper draws on some of the findings of the UNRISD research project Globalization, Export-Oriented Employment for Women and Social Policy; the full findings of the project have been published in an edited volume (Razavi, Pearson, and Danloy 2004) . This paper has benefited from useful discussions with Ruth Pearson, comments from three anonymous journal referees, and excellent research assistance provided by Alexandra Efthymiades.
1. In the face of espousal by European governments of the "adult worker model," paid work is now elevated to the primary citizenship obligation (Giullari and Lewis 2005) .
2. There are, however, important exceptions to this general global trend, notably in East and Central Europe and Central Asia, where there have been reversals in women's economic activity rates since the early 1990s (see Figure 1) .
3. Within the rural economy too, production for export markets has been intensified in recent years, most evident in the rapid growth of the nontraditional agro export sector in which women form a sizeable share of the workforce. This is particularly the case in Latin America.
4. There is however increasing interest in this area (e.g., Kabeer and Mahmud 2004) .
5. Katzenstein's work focused on corporatism as the central institutional mechanism that allows the small open and vulnerable economies of Europe to respond effectively to changes in the global economy by compensating for those changes politically and economically. A similar argument has been made more recently by Rodrik (1999) . Based on a crosscountry quantitative analysis, Rodrik (1999) documents a positive and robust association between an economy's exposure to foreign trade and the size of its government.
6. These are industrial assembly plants which primarily assemble imported U.S. inputs for reexport to the United States.
7. See Filgueira and Filgueira (2002) and Filgueira (forthcoming) for a useful typology of welfare states in Latin America.
8. This was manifested in the IMF programmes in Korea, Thailand and Indonesia following the 1997 -98 financial crisis, where according to Chang (2004) both the IMF and the World Bank put unprecedented emphasis on building "social safety network" devices.
9. One could argue that "full employment" was not a gender-neutral social objective. This is an important issue discussed further below.
10. ILO, UNRISD, UN/DESA, UNESCO, UNDP (and even some parts of the World Bank) are among the organizations often mentioned as those promoting this global discursive shift (see GASPP 2005).
11. The assessment by Huber and Stephens (2000a) was made on the basis of the Chilean case which is the only privatized pension system in existence long enough to allow for assessment of its consequences.
12. Corporate welfare originated in the 1920s during the Japanese colonial period and was largely the product of an arrangement between the state and the corporate sector whereby the former pressured the latter to provide nonwage benefits in return for financial rewards such as tax reductions and special loans.
13. Households headed by women, or with infants and elderly members, are considered to be less well-off (Kwon and Tchoe 2005) .
14. The fact that China maintains a nonconvertible currency, state control over its banking system and a broadly "gradualist" strategy is taken by some to suggest that it violates some of the key elements of IMF/World Bank prescription for "successful integration" (Jomo 2003 17. Lee (2005) draws particular attention to the tensions among working masses between migrants and veteran state workers.
18. Employment in the informal sector is measured as the share of workers in nonagricultural activities who are self-employed, working in micro enterprises or in domestic services. Pervasive informality of employment also means a low tax base, which hampers efforts to sustain social expenditure. Taxes constitute no more than 11 percent of GDP, which is lower than the regional average of 14 percent.
19. The categories of workers included: the self-employed, employees in micro businesses, street vendors, and unpaid workers.
20. The origin of these firms goes back to the early 1960s Border Industrialization Program, but they experienced a boom with the opening up of Mexican economy in the 1980s and the implementation of NAFTA in 1994.
